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CORRUPTION, CONSTITUTIONS, AND
CRUDE IN LATIN AMERICA'
Scheherazade S. Rehman, Ph.D.* and Frederick V. Perry, Ph.D., JD**
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the perception of corruption that exists throughout
Latin America, and analyzes the importance of the institutional environ-
ment in Latin American countries, which are both richly endowed with and
dependent on oil and natural gas. First, we look at corruption generally in
the region and then carry our analysis by looking at various countries'
GDP per capita versus several indices measuring different dimensions of
countries' economic development, political progress, and social perform-
ance. We also combine corruption indices and separate them by typology
of corruption in order to investigate the particular facets of corruption that
pose the greatest impediment to economic growth. We do this against the
backdrop of national constitutions and criminal codes that appear to out-
law corrupt behavior.
The paper's finding is that corruption has a differential impact on busi-
ness as opposed to political environment. In investigating the business en-
vironment, we find that the "business/legal system" component, which
captures corruption as perceived by a number of stakeholders, including
foreign investors, indeed plays a significant role in the context of corrup-
tion and economic growth. The "electoral system" component-which
combines such variables as a presence of electoral democracy, state of the
country (free/not free), and whether the country is autocracy or democ-
racy-is found to have a U-shape relationship with the measures of eco-
nomic and human development. The Latin American countries that are
rated as more corrupt have a larger export dependency on the sales of oil
and gas. Having an electoral democracy seems to have no significant effect
as all the Latin American countries enjoy approximately similar levels of
1. This article is a variation and adaptation of the work published in HOSSEIN
ASKARI, SCHEHERAZADE REHMAN AND NOORA AFRA,
CORRUPTION AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
(Edward Elgar Pub October 2010). This work focuses on Latin America whereas
the above-mentioned book focuses on the Persian Gulf.
* Scheherazade S. Rehman, Ph.D., Steve Ross Professorial Fellow of International
Finance, Professor of International Finance/Business and International Affairs,
and Director of the European Union Research Center, The George Washington
University, Washington D.C.
** Frederick V. Perry, JD, Ph.D., Clinical Professor of Legal Studies at the College of
Business Administration at Florida International University, is a former interna-
tional corporate lawyer and General Counsel of a multi-billion dollar global
corporation.
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human development and the laws that are supposed to guard against such
behavior have little salutary effect.
For many Latin Americans, oil is el excrement del diablo ..... 2 In the
popular imagination, and not only there, the progressive and benefi-
cial side of the oil industry-provision of lighting, heating, travel op-
portunities and astonishing innovations in petrochemicals-has been
tied inextricably with a darker side which has featured massive cor-
ruption . .. .3
I. INTRODUCTION
N Venezuela, the world's fifth largest producer of oil, the percentage
of its population that is poor has increased from 43 percent in 1998,
when oil traded at fifteen dollars per barrel to 53 percent in 2005
when the world price for oil was fifty dollars per barrel. 4 So, economic
resources and terms of trade do not appear to guarantee economic devel-
opment.5 In the recent past, corruption scandals have caused the down-
fall of governments in Brazil-Collor de Mello6-and Venezuela-Carlos
Andres Perez7-paving the way for the election of the populist Hugo
Chavez in Venezuela. In 2008, the accounting firm KPMG conducted a
survey of fraud and corruption in Mexico, and determined that 44 percent
of the companies that operate in Mexico paid some type of bribe to a
government official during the prior year.8 Corruption is costly; it has
been argued that when corruption is allowed to flourish, it is in the inter-
est of government officials to make and increase bureaucratic hurdles and
red tape, because this provides for more opportunity to demand bribes.9
Although the level of corruption and restrictions on economic free-
dom are high in many countries that rely heavily on oil and gas pro-
duction as a source of GDP and exports, their impact on economic
2. The devil's excrement.
3. GEORGE PHILIP, 01 AND POLInCS IN LATIN AMERICA: NATIONALIST MOVE-
MENTS AND STATE COMPANIE-S 1 (1982).
4. Alvaro Vargas Llosa, The Case of Latin America, in MAKING POOR NATIONS
RICh: ENTIRIPRENEURSIIII' AND T-IE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOIMINT 189,
192 (Benjamin Powell ed., 2008).
5. Id.
6. Fernando Affonso Collor de Mello served as president of Brazil from 1990 to 1992,
when he resigned to avoid impeachment over alleged influence peddling. DONALD
V. COES, MACROECONOMIC CRISES, POLICIES, AND GRowII IN BRAZIL, 1964-90
29 (1995).
7. Carlos Andres Perez was President of Venezuela from 1974 to 1979 and from 1989
to 1993, when he was accused of embezzlement and misuse of public funds. The
Supreme Court found him guilty and he was imprisoned for two years. See Carlos
Andres Perez Facts, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com[EB
checked/topic/451417/Carlos-Andres-Perez (last visited May 2, 2014).
8. KPMG, Encuesta de Fraude y Corrupci6n en Mdxico 4 (2008), https://www.kpmg
.com/MX/es/IssuesAnd lnsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Estudios/Encues
tafraude enMexico_2010.pdf.
9. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO "IIIE POVERTY OF7 NA-
TIONS, VOLUME 11 (1968).
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growth is not clear-cut. Corruption may have little or no impact on
overall GDP growth of these economies because world demand for
oil and gas is projected to rise steeply and thus many of these coun-
tries should continue to benefit from oil and gas sales for the foresee-
able future.
Countries dependent on oil and natural gas, are faced with a number
of challenges-including how to diversify their economies, attract
foreign investment and integrate their economies into the global eco-
nomic framework (by joining organizations such as the World Trade
Organization-WTO)'°-and in the process how to reduce corrup-
tion and improve their overall business environment and economic
freedom."
Many economists appear clear in their belief that from the standpoint
of creating sustainable growth, eliminating corruption, and increasing ec-
onomic freedom, with equal access for all players would play an impor-
tant and positive role in development, because corruption and the
absence of economic freedom adversely affect growth.12 The United Na-
tions, for example, is "[c]oncerned about the seriousness of problems and
threats posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies, un-
dermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and
justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law, ' 13
and has, among other things, promulgated the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Corruption.14 The American economist Benjamin Powell
has said:
In recent years the economics profession and policy world have be-
gun to pay more attention to the institutional environment necessary
for economic growth. Geography and other explanations for success
have begun to be pushed aside as institutions have become increas-
ingly recognized as the main driver of economic success. . . . In
Washington DC people in policy circles now generally, though in-
completely, acknowledge the need for private property rights and
the rule of law for economic development.
15
In this article, we discuss the impact of oil and gas resources on the oil
and natural gas exporting countries.16 Accordingly, we shall introduce a
definition of corruption and provide an introduction to some manifesta-
tions of corruption in the Latin American oil-exporting countries. We
will focus slightly on the law as it deals with corruption in the region; and
10. Elisa Diehl, Sound Policies Behind Strong Growth, INT'L MONETARY FUND (June
7, 2007), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftlsurvey/so/2007/CAR066A.htm.
11. ASKARI ET AL., supra note 1, at 77.
12. Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 700-701 (1995).
13. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2345 U.N.T.S. 41.
14. Id.
15. Llosa, supra note 4, at 2.
16. Those countries in the region that are engaged the export of oil and/or natural gas
are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. CIA,
The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2241rank.html (last visited May 2, 2014).
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finally we will take a look at the impact of oil and gas dependency on
corruption.
In addition, we will examine how corruption is generally measured, and
then attempt to determine whether corruption is more prevalent in Latin
America than in other similarly situated petroleum- and gas-exporting
countries, and whether the incidence of corruption in those Latin Ameri-
can countries with abundant supplies of oil and natural gas is different
either in scope or amount than in countries not so well endowed with
natural resources. We will then take a look at how corruption affects
economic and social development. We will examine the way that consti-
tutions and laws deal with the subject.
Corruption gives rise to a vicious and troubling cycle for the countries
of the region, because according to the United Nations, corruption is "in-
sidious ... and [has] .. .damaging effects ... on the welfare of entire
nations and their peoples. Corruption not only distorts economic deci-
sion-making, it also deters investment, undermines competitiveness and,
ultimately, weakens economic growth."' 7 In fact, corruption makes for
an uneven playing field, and those with influence or money or both get
things, while those who are simply deserving or good at what they do, do
not. Investors-including foreign investors-who do not have confidence
either in the economy, the regime, or the courts are reluctant to invest, so
that much needed foreign investment is scared away. Economists' re-
search has proven this to be the case; and this negative effect on invest-
ment has an accompanying negative effect on beneficial economic
growth.' 8 This negative impact has a knock-on effect on other areas of
growth because it affects government expenditures, and economist Paolo
Mauro finds corruption and political instability to be "negatively and sig-
nificantly" correlated to the portion of government spending on educa-
tion as a percentage share of total government spending. 19
If the institutional environment is impersonal and tends to decentral-
ize power, providing citizens with a certain amount of security re-
garding their property and the contracts into which they choose to
enter with others, the result tends to be sustained economic growth
and therefore long term prosperity. If the rules limit the capacity of
the authorities or of third parties to invade the sovereign sphere of
the individual by the use of superior force, the effect will usually be a
framework that creates incentives for creative initiative as well as for
saving and investing, thereby triggering an increase in productivity.20
Some view unfettered entrepreneurship as both a measure of and a
means of combating corruption. Entrepreneurship can be either con-
17. UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, THE GI-03AL PROGRAM AGAINST CORRUP-
TION: UN ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOLKrI, 5 (3rd ed., 2004).
18. Mauro, supra note 11, at 700-01.
19. Id.; Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey
and Some New Results, in COMBATING CORRUI'ON IN LATIN AMERICA 22 (Jo-
seph S. Tulchin & Ralph H. Espach eds., 2000).
20. Llosa, supra note 4, at 193.
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structive or parasitical, according to how the rules that govern economic
life determine the payoffs to different entrepreneurial activities. 21 This
idea of parasitic entrepreneurship has been defined as a "tendency to
seek profits and alter market conditions by political means. '2 2 Some say
that corruption has always existed; at least as long as human social orga-
nizations have existed. 23 Corruption is generally considered pervasive
around the world, and no region of the world is considered immune from
it.24 It is also often said that countries endowed with heavy deposits of
natural resources, especially petroleum reserves, are especially
susceptible.
What is "corruption?" What do the measurements tell us about how
much of it goes on and where? There are a variety of measurement indi-
ces used to measure corruption and a number of definitions used. Many
such definitions were devised by international organizations, primarily
with the view to stamping out corruption,2 5 and these organizations en-
gage in a myriad of activities toward this end, including measuring states'
compliance with their agreements to implement anti-corruption legisla-
tion and campaigns within their boundaries.
The most commonly used definition by U.S.-based international law-
yers is "the abuse of public office for private gain."' 26 Those same lawyers
of course argue over the definition of each of the words in the foregoing
definition and their implication because they generally use such defini-
tions to bring charges or defend against such charges before courts or
other decision making institutions with the authority to mete out
punishments.
For the World Bank, corruption is seen as:
[T]he abuse of public office for private gain. This private gain could
be in the form of money or favors for the benefit of family or
friends-or for the benefit of special interest groups such as a political
21. William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive,
98 J. OF POL. ECON. 893, 894 (1990).
22. STANISLAV ANDRESKI, PARASITISM AN1) SUBVERSION: TIHE CASE OF LATIN
AMERICA 77 (1969).
23. ASKARI ET AL., supra note 1.
24. Press Release, Transparency Int'l, Corruption Threatens Global Economic Recov-
ery, Greatly Challenges Countries in Conflict, (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://
www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20091117_corruption-threatensglobal-
economic recovery.
25. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2345 U.N.T.S. 41;
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
Nov. 21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Conv
CombatBriberyENG.pdf; Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Apr.
29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724; Annual Integrity Report: Fiscal Years 2005-2006, Ti-w
WoRlD) BANK, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/7538030/annu
al-integrity-report-fiscal-years-2005-2006 (last visited May 2, 2014); Governance &
Anti-Corruption, Ti-w WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/KUDGZ5E6P0 (last
visited May 2, 2014).
26. JOHN W. HEAD & DAVID FRISCH, GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW: PRINCIPLES AN1) PRAC-
TICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND INVESTMENr 651 (2nd ed. 2007).
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party seeking to obtain or retain power. Such behavior by persons
concerned with the procurement process often leads to economic
losses for the public. Thus, many lose for the benefit of a few.27
Further, the UN believes that "[c]orruption is one outcome of poor
governance, involving the abuse of public office for private gain."'2 8 The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) also "views these two concepts as
"closely linked" and says that "a poor governance environment offers
greater incentives and more opportunities for corruption. '29
There are now also a number of private definitions used to measure
and indicate global corruption. In February of 2006 the African Develop-
ment Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Re-
construction and Development, European Investment Bank Group,
International Monetary Fund, Inter-American Development Bank
Group and the World Bank Group met to establish a Joint International
Financial Institution Anti-Corruption Task Force, whose charge it was "to
work towards a consistent and harmonized approach to combat corrup-
tion in the activities and operations of the member institutions. 30
The members of the task force recognized that: "[c]ritical to the success
of a harmonized approach is a common understanding of the practices
prohibited."'31 Accordingly, the task force agreed that for them the fol-
lowing would be the "standardized definitions of fraudulent and corrupt
practices" to be used by them for investigating and measuring such prac-
tices with an eye to stamping them out within the states covered by their
member institutions:32
* A corrupt practice is the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, di-
rectly or indirectly, anything of value to influence improperly the ac-
tions of another party.
" A fraudulent practice is any act or omission, including a misrepresen-
tation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead,
a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an
obligation.
" A coercive practice is impairing or harming, or threatening to impair
or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party
to influence improperly the actions of a party.
27. WORLD BANK, STRENGTHENING WORLD BANK GROUP ENGAGEMENT ON GOV-
ERNANCE AND ANTICORRUVON 67 (Mar. 21, 2007) available at http://www-wds
.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/B/2007/03/22/000020
439_20070322090727/Rendered/PDF/390550replacement.pdf.
28. Id. at i.
29. The IMF and Good Governance: Factsheet, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 18,
2014), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/gov.pdf.
30. INT'L FIN. INSTS. ANTI-CORRUP'I'ION TASK FORCE, UNIFORM FRAMEWORK FOR
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* A collusive practice is an arrangement between two or more parties
designed to achieve an improper purpose, including influencing im-
properly the actions of another party.
33
As can be seen from what appears below, corruption appears to be
pervasive throughout the Latin American region. Some might say it is
because there are no rules in these countries, or those rules and laws that
do exist are simply too primitive fully to deal with issues like sophisti-
cated or comprehensive corruption. As will be seen, however, nothing
could be further from the truth. Most countries do indeed have a highly
developed set of laws and rules that very clearly outlaw corruption. 34 In
fact, most countries in the region outwardly accept the connection be-
tween corruption and stunted economic growth; and they accept that a
country's natural resources belong to the state and are to benefit its
citizens.
II. CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE GENERAL PERCEPTION
For decades many have acknowledged that corruption exists in Latin
America in a very deep and pervasive way, though it has not been until
recently that researchers have tackled this issue in order fully to define it,
expose its manifestations, and suggest ways to combat it.35 Whenever a
sexy or juicy high-profile case of corruption is uncovered, it makes the
headlines. People are duly scandalized by it; and this occurs with fre-
quency in Latin America. However "[b]eyond the more high profile
cases-the tips of real and imagined icebergs-substantial evidence sug-
gests that in much of Latin America corruption permeates daily life."
36
And this corruption is "often the rule rather than the exception," tainting
the acquisitions of varied licenses and permits and in dealing with routine
traffic infractions. 37 The perception of Latin America in the industrial-
ized nations of the world was formed early and has remained.
In the late nineteenth century, and then growing inexorably in the
twentieth, the industrialized world, especially the United States and the
United Kingdom, began to engage in exploration and the exploitation of
oil concessions in Latin America. This was a risky proposition for them,
but world demand was growing and some made large profits. Others did
not do so well. 38 From the very beginning, it was clear to those foreign
companies that corruption was rampant and bribery was the watchword
33. Id.
34. See Lei No. 12.846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, Di~rio Oficial da Uni~o [D.O.U.] de
2.8.2013 (Braz.) available at http://www.cov.com/files/upload/E-AlertAttachment
Brazilian_- CleanCompanies Act-Original.pdf (Clean Company Act).
35. Charles H. Blake & Stephen D. Morris, Political and Analytical Challenges of Cor-
ruption in Latin America, in CORRUIIION & DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 10
(Charles H. Blake & Stephen D. Morris, eds., 2009).
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id.
38. See PHILIP, supra note 3, at 12-14 (1982).
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of the day if they expected to get much accomplished. As an example, in
Peru: "[tihe great advantage of foreign firms was that ... they were pre-
pared to pay bribes. '39
With respect to Bolivia, the British Minister reported in the early twen-
tieth century, in connection with the negotiation for oil concessions that
"[b]lackmail is a thriving business and gives occupation and a means of
livelihood to Senators, Deputies and others who have studied it . . . to a
fine art."'40 The same was true in Venezuela and elsewhere in the re-
gion.4' The foreign oil companies were complicit in corruption. Many
times the Latin American nationalists in their various countries be-
lieved-and often still do-that the foreign oil companies wished to keep
the governments of the region weak or corrupt so that they could more
easily get what they wanted-lucrative concessions for exploitation-
through bribery.42
In the early 1900s, British Lord Cowdrey, then head of the Mexican
Eagle Oil Company, a British oil company, received a letter from his en-
voy who was exploring the possibility of negotiating concessions for Brit-
ish oil interests in South America, which stated that:
I have no doubt that you realize that the sort of concession that we
are trying to get does not appeal to any government and that it is
very difficult to obtain it in a country enjoying a real parliamentary
system; it is to my mind only easy in countries of a one man govern-
ment like Mexico under President Diaz,43 Venezuela under Gomez 44
or Columbia under Reyes.45
To one degree or another, these countries have established subsidized
housing, education and other programs for some decades, which of
course amount to a way of sharing oil revenues with the population.46
39. Id. at 32.
40. Id. at 33.
41. Id. at 33 (citing FO 371 A 2334/2334/55, Annual Report for Bolivia (1930)).
42. Id. at 32.
43. Jos6 de la Cruz Porfirio Diaz Mori (1830-1915) was President of Mexico from 1876
to 1911, except a four-year term served by a political ally. Diaz was overthrown in
the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and forced into exile in France in 1911. Biogra-
phies: President Porfirio Diaz, PBS.oRG, http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/
biographies/porfiriodiaz.html (last visited May 2, 2014)
44. Juan Vicente G6mez Chac6n (1857-1935) was de facto ruler of Venezuela from
1908 to 1935. He was president three times during those years, and died in office.
Juan Vicente G6mez, BIOGRANIAS Y VIDAS, http://www.biografiasyvidas.com/bio
grafia/g/gomezjuan.htm (last visited May 2, 2014).
45. Rafael Reyes was President from 1904 to 1909 as a military ruler representing the
Conservatives. "In the course of his regime, Reyes improved the country's fi-
nances, expanded roads and railroads, and encouraged increased coffee produc-
tion. Large U.S. investments and purchases of coffee and minerals contributed to
Colombia's economic growth." However, Reyes (1849-1921) ruled Colombia as a
dictator, and was eventually forced into exile in 1909. History, Loss of Panama,
COUNTRIESQUEST.COM, http://www.countriesquest.com/southamerica/colombia/
history/loss-ofpanama.htm (last visited May 2, 2014).
46. Jose Gregorfo Pineda & Francisco Rodrfguez, Curse or Blessing? Natural Re-
sources and Human Development, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERI-
CAN ECONOMICs 421 (Jos6 Antonio Ocampo & Jaime Rose eds., 2011).
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But this activity has not benefitted all people equally and of course they
have not fully concerned themselves with what happens to future genera-
tions. At times when high oil revenues allow for greater subsidies to the
population at large, corruption can be disguised or hidden somewhat, but
when revenues decrease and subsidies are not forthcoming, the popula-
tion begins to ask questions. In addition "[m]ost oil exporting countries
tend to use oil rents to provide employment guarantees in the public sec-
tor, leading to often non-value added jobs with little room for advance-
ment" and often bloated individual drive and ambition.
47
According to some researchers, the faulty allocation of talented people
from productive economic sectors to those activities that merely seek
what economists call rents-simply money with no real production or
beneficial effects to show for the activity-has had a real negative impact
on overall economic growth.48
Democracy is on the rise in Latin America, and is generally considered
to be governing all countries in the region except Cuba.4 9 Democracy
with reduced economic roles for government, increased transparency and
increased accountability was expected to bring about a concomitant re-
duction in corruption. Many have been disillusioned by reality. 50 As a
result of the democratization of Latin America in the 1980s, the activities
of politicians became somewhat more transparent, or at least that is what
the concept of democracy is supposed to entail. Populations who were
now in a position to expect more from their elected governments began
to demand more, and whereas in the old days they either did not have a
great collective notion of corruption or did not think they could voice an
objection to it, now they voice their concerns and disillusionment with
such activity. But some say democracy does not always prevent corrup-
tion.5 ' In fact, some say that corruption has increased in Latin America
since the transitions to democracy. 52
Studies suggest that democracy does have an ameliorating effect on
corruption,5 3 but it still persists in Latin America, and some believe that
47. ASKARI ET AL., supra note 1, at 21.
48. See Carlos Leite & Jens Weidmann, Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Re-
sources, Corruption, and Economic Growth (tnt'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper
WP199/85, July 1999).
49. See DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: (Ri)CONSTRUCING POLITICAL SOCIIm'Y
(Manuel Antonio Garret6n M. and Edward Newman, eds., 2001); Moisds Nafm,
Democracy Dictates Latin America's Future, FIN. TIMES, April 26, 2002.
50. See COMBATING CORRUFITION IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 19.
51. Stephen D. Morris, Corruption and Democracy at the State Level in Mexico, in
CORRuu'rION & DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 171 (Charles H. Blake & Ste-
phen D. Morris eds., 2009).
52. Id. (citing Laurence Whitehead, High Level Political Corruption in Latin America:
A Transitional Phenomenon? in POLrIICAL CORRUIrION ": CONCIAPI'S AND CON-
TEXTS 801-818 (Arnold J. Hidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 3rd ed. 2002);
Kurt Weyland Politics of Corruption in Latin America, 9 J. DEMOCRACY 108-121
(1998)).
53. Strom C. Thacker, Democracy, Economic Policy, and Political Corruption in Com-
parative Perspective, in CORRUPTION & DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 26
(Charles H. Blake & Stephen D. Morris eds., 2009) (citing Charles Blake & Chris-
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the beneficial effects of democracy on corruption will take time.54
Law is considered to be an instrument of social control. The idea is
that society attempts to achieve uniform behavior generally by
describing behavior that is prohibited. The desired behavior is then
encouraged by discouraging the undesired behavior through punish-
ment. The populations of many states today consider themselves to
be living under the rule of law. They believe that the rule of law
bestows upon them, as citizens, the advantages of the prevention of
arbitrary and corrupt government, the restraint of vengeance, and
the provision of individual liberty and economic prosperity.
Some of the very first principles of the concept of the rule of law are
that a law must be made public and must be reasonably clear in
meaning and specific in what it prohibits. And, of course, it must be
applied equally to all, that is, without discrimination. The rule of law
is considered an essential element of a functioning democracy and a
functioning economy. This sentiment has been echoed time and
again by many, including the United Nations itself, which said:
Promoting the rule of law at the national and international levels is
at the heart of the United Nations' mission. Establishing respect
for the rule of law is fundamental to achieving a durable peace in
the aftermath of conflict, to the effective protection of human
rights, and to sustained economic progress and development. The
principle that everyone-from the individual right up to the State
itself-is accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally
enforced and independently adjudicated, is a fundamental concept
which drives much of the United Nations work.
Another principal tenet of the rule of law is that government should
maintain peace and order, for the most part through a system of laws
or rules that specify both violations and their corresponding sanc-
tions accruing to violators .... This leads to the notion that no act
can be regarded as a crime unless there is a specific law prohibiting it
and no one can be punished unless they have committed an unlawful
act described as a crime. Legal scholars refer to these concepts as
nullum crimen sin lege (no crime without a law) and nulla poena sin
crimine (no punishment without a crime). In other words, crimes
must be clearly defined. 55
topher Martin, The Dynamics of Political Corruption: Reexamining the Influence
of Democracy, 13 DEMOCRATIZATION 1-14 (2006); Alok K. Bohara, Neil J. Mitch-
ell & Carl F. Mittendorf, Compound Democracy and the Control of Corruption: A
Cross-Country Investigation, 32, PO'Y STUiD. J. 481-99 (2004)).
54. Id. at 27.
55. Frederick V. Perry, Multinationals at Risk: Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 7 FlU
L. REV. 43, 61-62 (2011) (citing WIILIAM LAWRENCE CLARK & WILLIAM LAW-
RENCE MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON -HE LAW OF CRIMES 1-4, 64 (Marian Quinn
Barnes ed., 7th ed. 1967); Andrew Altman, ARGUING ABour LAW: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO LEGAL PiiILOSOPiiY 5, 18 (Peter Adams et al. eds., 2d ed., 2001); 0. Lee
Reed, Law, the Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for the Private Market
and Business Study, AM. Bus. L. J., Apr. 1, 2001, available at http://www.allbusi
ness.com/legal/3484583-1.html; UNITED NATIONS & THE Ru!LE OF LAW http://www
.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml (last visited May 2, 2014)).
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As will be seen, acts generally considered acts of corruption are unlaw-
ful in the countries examined in this study. It appears therefore, as will
be seen from what appears below, that while laws do exist, the "rule of
law" lags behind.
III. CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA:
LOOKING AT THE LAW
It is not as if corruption is allowed under the laws of the countries in
Latin America. It is unlawful on a variety of levels. It is clearly against
international law as recognized in Latin America, since all the nations of
Latin America (except Suriname) are signatories of the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption.56 The UN Convention defines corrup-
tion57 and requires states to implement measures and legislation to out-
law corrupt activities in their countries.58
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention was signed by forty countries, includ-
ing five countries from Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colum-
bia, and Mexico. 59 The OECD convention was negotiated and signed at
the request of the U.S. Congress and the President of the United States60
inasmuch as the United States had been alone among the industrialized
world in prohibiting its citizens from engaging in the bribery of foreign
government officials under its own Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977.61 The OECD convention calls for those countries that have signed
and adopted the convention to make the bribery of foreign government
officials to obtain business a crime and it puts in place a way for states to
monitor the compliance of other signatory states. 62
The collective lip-service and law of the hemisphere also deals with the
subject. In its Declaration of Principles, the Summit of the Americas of
1994 stated that: "[e]ffective democracy requires a comprehensive attack
on corruption as a factor of social disintegration and distortion of the
economic system that undermines the legitimacy of political institu-
56. G.A. Res. 55/61, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.un
.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/58/4&Lang=E (United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, 140 nations are signatories).
57. Id. at ch. I.
58. Id. at ch. III, art. 15.
59. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at http://www
.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBriberyENG.pdf; Country Reports on the
implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, http://www.oecd
.org/investment/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconven
tion.htm (last visited May 2, 2014).
60. JOHN W. HEAD, GLOIBAL BUSINESS LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTlICES OF INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCE AND INVESTMENT 665 (3d. ed. 2007).
61. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 § 104(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1-2 (2012).
62. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, supra note 59, arts. 1, 12.
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tions. ' '63 The following Summits of the Americas either repeated or built
upon these principles. The thirty-four participating heads of state, includ-
ing all in the hemisphere except Cuba, signed the foregoing declaration,
and nearly all countries of the hemisphere have signed subsequent ones.
64
The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption adopted in Ca-
racas, Venezuela on March 29, 1996, signed by thirty-four and ratified by
thirty-three of the nations in the hemisphere,65 including all those Latin
American states included in this study, states in its preamble: "that fight-
ing corruption strengthens democratic institutions and prevents distor-
tions in the economy, improprieties in public administration and damage
to a society's moral fiber.' '66 It further requires that the signatory states
maintain and strengthen:
1. Standards of conduct for the correct, honorable, and proper fulfill-
ment of public functions. These standards shall be intended to pre-
vent conflicts of interest and mandate the proper conservation and
use of resources entrusted to government officials in the perform-
ance of their functions. These standards shall also establish mea-
sures and systems requiring government officials to report to
appropriate authorities acts of corruption in the performance of
public functions. Such measures should help preserve the public's
confidence in the integrity of public servants and government
processes.
2. Mechanisms to enforce these standards of conduct.
3. Instruction to government personnel to ensure proper understand-
ing of their responsibilities and the ethical rules governing their
activities.
4. Systems for registering the income, assets and liabilities of persons
who perform public functions in certain posts as specified by law
and, where appropriate, for making such registrations public.
5. Systems of government hiring and procurement of goods and ser-
vices that assure the openness, equity and efficiency of such
systems.
6. Government revenue collection and control systems that deter
corruption.
7. Laws that deny favorable tax treatment for any individual or cor-
poration for expenditures made in violation of the anticorruption
laws of the States Parties.
63. Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Principles, Dec. 11, 1994, reprinted in
MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 12, 1994, at A12-13, available at http://www.summit-ameri
cas.org/i-summit/i-summit-dec-en.pdf.
64. See Alfredo Prieto, Everybody But Cuba, HAVANA TIMES (Apr. 15, 2009, 7:25
AM), http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=7477.
65. Against Corruption: Signatories and Ratifications, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES [OAS], http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html (last visited May
2, 2014).
66. INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION, pmbl., Mar. 29, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 724 (1996), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58
.html.
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8. Systems for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in
good faith, report acts of corruption, including protection of their
identities, in accordance with their Constitutions and the basic
principles of their domestic legal systems.
9. Oversight bodies with a view to implementing modern mechanisms
for preventing, detecting, punishing, and eradicating corrupt acts.
10. Deterrents to the bribery of domestic and foreign government offi-
cials, such as mechanisms to ensure that publicly held companies
and other types of associations maintain books and records which,
in reasonable detail, accurately reflect the acquisition and disposi-
tion of assets, and have sufficient internal accounting controls to
enable their officers to detect corrupt acts.
11. Mechanisms to encourage participation by civil society and non-
governmental organizations in efforts to prevent corruption.
12. The study of further preventive measures that take into account the
relationship between equitable compensation and probity in public
service.67
In other words, the signatory countries agreed to make corruption un-
lawful and to rid their countries of corruption.
Article VI of the Convention defines corruption as follows:
Acts of Corruption
1. This Convention is applicable to the following acts of corruption:
a. The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a govern-
ment official or a person who performs public functions, of any arti-
cle of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise,
or advantage for himself or for another person or entity, in exchange
for any act or omission in the performance of his public functions;
b. The offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a government
official or a person who performs public functions, of any article of
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise, or
advantage for himself or for another person or entity, in exchange
for any act or omission in the performance of his public functions;
c. Any act or omission in the discharge of his duties by a government
official or a person who performs public functions for the purpose of
illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party;
d. The fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from any
of the acts referred to in this article; and
e. Participation as a principal, co-principal, instigator, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact, or in any other manner, in the commission or
attempted commission of, or in any collaboration or conspiracy to
commit, any of the acts referred to in this article.
2. This Convention shall also be applicable by mutual agreement be-
tween or among two or more States Parties with respect to any other
act of corruption not described herein.68
67. Id. art. III.
68. Id. art. VI.
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That is what international law says for the Latin Americans. Inasmuch
as these conventions are treaties, they have the force of internal law
within each country.69 The constitutions of the various countries are also
very clear on the subject of-in some cases also corruption, but always-
the use of natural resources. A state's natural resources belong to the
people and they must be exploited and shared in order to benefit the
people, 70 and accordingly the misuse of a state's natural resources is con-
trary to the provisions of the constitutions of nearly all of the states in
question.71 Similarly corruption and the acceptance of bribes is a viola-
tion of the criminal laws of these Latin American countries. 72
So there is no dearth of rules in Latin America, all of which make it
very clear that corruption and bribery-of government officials in most
cases, but bribery in general in many cases-are outlawed with heavy
sanctions for the transgressor, if caught.
IV. CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA:
MEASURING CORRUPTION
Measuring manifestations of or the perception of corruption across
similar countries is not an easy task, but it is much for difficult and
fraught with problems when one attempts to devise a useful, single index
to measure and then rank corruption over such a diverse range of coun-
tries as those making up the Latin American region. There are a variety
of methods that have been used to measure corruption within countries
and they can generally be grouped into three fairly broad categories: (1)
measures devised by mostly private firms who earn their living advising
and consulting in the area of political risk; (2) indices that are based on
what is termed "perception," designed by NGO's or advocacy groups;
and (3) wide ranging governance indices that their designers view as re-
lated to corruption.
69. MALCOM N. SHIAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 926 (6th ed. 2008).
70. In some countries where the constitution appears ambiguous, such as that of Co-
lombia, legal scholars assure us that inasmuch as the Spanish Crown was the origi-
nal owners of all mines and subsoil rights, those subsoil rights passed on to the
newly independent state of Columbia, and that national ownership-and the at-
tendant obligation to exploit those rights for the people-was never derogated.
See, e.g., Lufs ENRIQUE CUFRVO PONTON, La Propriedad y los Yaciminentos de
Hidrocarburos en el Derecho Colombiano, in INTRODUCCION AL DriuEciio Y LA
P(LITICA DE PEIriOF.EOS, 74 (2001).
71. See, e.g., CONSTIrrucION DI- LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR art. 246, Registro
Oficial 449, 20 de Octubre de 2008; Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos [C.P.] art. 27 Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de
1917 (Mex.); Venez. Const. art. 12; Art. 41, CONS-rI1UTION NACIONAL [CoNsT.
NAG.] (Arg.); Constituiq~o Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 176 (Braz.).
72. See CoiGo PENAL arts. 198-203 (Venez.); C6d. Pen. art. 264 (Ecuador) (likewise
art. 204 of the Constitution of Ecuador outlaws bribery and corruption); CODIGO
PENAL [C. PEN.] arts. 404-412 (Colom.); C6DIGO PENAL [COD. PEN.] arts. 266-68(Arg.); C6digo Penal Federal [CPF] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, arts.
215, 217-18, 220, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 14 de Agosto de 1931
(Mex.); CODIGO PENAL [C.P.] arts. 316-17 (Braz.).
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Each of the ways of looking at corruption as espoused by each of the
foregoing types of measurements has its strength and weaknesses. Each
of these approaches vary in the scope and precision of metrics that they
employ; they vary in the ways they measure and assess corruption and its
impact on business or other institutions of civil and political society along
with the mechanisms in government or otherwise, which either encourage
or inhibit corruption. 73
A. PRIVATE MEASUREMENT
Private institutions like the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and Po-
litical Risk Services (PRS) use data collected from correspondents with
certain specific country expertise, business related surveys and other data.
PRS's International Country Risk Guide attempts to describe and mea-
sure the extent and likelihood of government officials demanding
bribes. 74 Since most subscribers to the PRS are banks, multinationals,
and investors, the assessments generally focus on items of interest to busi-
ness. 75 Of course such a bundle of measurements would ideally be simply
a component of a general overall measurement of corruption in a given
country.
B. ADVOCACY GROUP AND NGO DESIGNED SURVEYS
The most widely known set of indices in this group are the ones devised
by the Berlin based Transparency International (TI) and the World Bank
Institute (WBI), both of which measure corruption by means of a series
of surveys reported by the general public and representatives of business.
These indices assume that the perception of specific groups of respon-
dents, such as business leaders, public servants and the general public,
accurately reflects the levels and patterns of corruption in a given coun-
try. These indicators generally are designed to measure the levels of gov-
ernance and corruption in order determine the need for assistance by
international organizations or NGO's in the areas of governance, rule of
law, and the like. The TI index, known as the Corruption Perception In-
dex (CPI) is generally considered the most widely known and used. The
CPI is not based on TI's own experts, rather on outside experts and
surveys. The survey is issued annually; a score of 100 represents a total
absence of corruption and a zero represents total corruption.
76
73. See Stephen Knack, Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A
Critique of the Cross-Country Indicators (World Bank Policy Research, Working
Paper 3968, July 2006).
74. Jakob Svensson, Eight Questions about Corruption, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 22
(2005).
75. See Carlos Leite & Jens Weidmann, Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Re-
sources, Corruption, and Economic Growth (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper
WP/99/85, July 1999).
76. Corruption Perceptions Index: In Detail, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.trans
parency.org/cpi20l3/indetail (last visited May 5, 2014).
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The CPI uses from three to sixteen sources, requiring at least three.
The WBI's Control of Corruption Index (CCI) on the other hand, re-
quires only one source per country. The WBI maintains that the CPI has
limitations and that the CCI is better, since those poorer and less devel-
oped countries are those where fewer sources are used by the CPI and
thus, according to the WBI, the levels of corruption may be higher in such
countries, yet the available measurements are far fewer. The CCI uses
units that range from -2.5 to +2.5 in its measurements; the higher the
values, the better the governance-and therefore less corruption. Some
commentators criticize these indices for use in country comparison pur-
poses because the number of sources and the very sources themselves are
not consistent across countries. 77
Another criticism of such indices is that they are based on perception,
and in oil-rich countries when oil prices are high there is the possibility
(or probability, depending on one's point of view) that economic growth,
ease of doing business, and general overall feeling of ease is due to a
strong inflow of petro revenues, and that such a feeling will decline with
the decline in world oil prices. Despite such criticism, given the sinister
nature of corruption a completely accurate empirical measurement sys-
tem may not be possible.
C. BROAD GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
These indices are also developed by advocacy organizations though the
corruption component is just one component of a larger set of govern-
ance indicators, since these organizations generally start from the idea
that corruption is a product of weak governance. For this type of index,
corruption is considered to be related to government policies and to the
nature of institutions within a state, for example the level of bureaucracy,
the way that business is regulated, and the level of economic, civil and
political liberties and the like. While these indices of course may not be
exact measures of corruption, it can be argued that inasmuch as they are
empirical measurements, they are superior to perception based indices.
Tables 1-3 reflect a summary of a number of measurements by a vari-
ety of institutions that measure government, legal and political corruption
in a number of ways 78
77. See ASKARI, ET AL., supra note 1.
78. ASKARI E AL., supra note 1, at 14.
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TABLE 1: MEASURING GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION
Type Definition Source
Governance Governance is the traditions and WB Control of
institutions by which authority in a country Corruption Governance
is exercised for the common good. This indicators (Kaufmann,
includes the process by which those in Kraay, and Mastruzzi)
authority are selected, monitored, and
replaced (the political dimension); the
government's capacity to effectively
manage its resources and implement sound
policies (the economic dimension); and the
respect of citizens and the state for the
country's institutions (the institutional
respect dimension).
Public "Public Governance" is the response to the Basel Institute on
Governance challenges of globalization in terms of Governance
effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness
facing the public sector. It also addresses
the dramatic changes that regulation and
management of society have undergone
over the past decades. Public governance
seeks to understand and conceptualize
appropriate forms of state-society relations
that are capable of responding to this
complex environment. By addressing
institutional capacity and constituting the
framework for equitable and legitimate
political structures, it has become a key
concept for public management reform.
Rent Seeking It is the extra amount paid (over what IMF
would be paid for the best alternative use)
to somebody or for something useful whose
supply is limited either by nature or
through human ingenuity.
Government Measuring the quality of public services, WB Control of
Effectiveness the quality of the civil service and the Corruption Governance
degree of its independence from political indicators (Kaufmann,
pressures, the quality of policy formulation Kraay, and Mastruzzi)
and implementation, and the credibility of
the government's commitment to such
policies.
State Capture The survey design permits an in-depth WB Business
empirical analysis of governance and Environment and
corruption, unbundling governance into its Enterprise Performance
component dimensions. This allows a more Survey (BEEPS)
detailed quantitative assessment of
corruption, a more nuanced understanding
of the causes of the problem and as a
result a stronger foundation for policy
advice. Particular attention is paid to
"state capture" by parts of the corporate
sector (i.e., the propensity of firms to shape
the underlying "rules of the game"
including "purchase" of legislation and
court decisions).
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Voice and Measuring the extent to which a country's WB Control of
Accountability citizens are able to participate in selecting Corruption Governance
their government, as well as freedom of indicators (Kaufmann,
expression, freedom of association, and a Kraay, and Mastruzzi)
free media.
Control of Measuring the extent to which public WB Control of
Corruption power is exercised for private gain, Corruption Governance
including both petty and grand forms of indicators (Kaufmann,
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state Kraay, and Mastruzzi)
by elites and private interests.
Regulatory Measuring the ability of the government to WB Control of
Quality formulate and implement sound policies Corruption Governance
and regulations that permit and promote indicators (Kaufmann,
private sector development. Kraay, and Mastruzzi)
TABLE 2: MEASURING RULE OF LAW AND CORRUPTION
Type Definition Source
Rule of Law Measuring the extent to which agents have WB Control of
confidence in and abide by the rules of Corruption Governance
society, and in particular the quality of indicators (Kaufmann,
contract enforcement, the police, and the Kraay, and Mastruzzi)
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence.
Conflict of Conflict of interest: a situation in which a WB Control of
Interest party has interests that could improperly Corruption Governance
influence that party's performance of its indicators (Kaufmann,
official duties or responsibilities, Kraay, and Mastruzzi)
contractual obligations, or compliance with
applicable laws and regulations.
TABLE 3: MEASURING THE POLITICAL CORRUPTION
Type Definition Source
Political Measuring perceptions of the likelihood WB Control of
stability and that the government will be destabilized or Corruption Governance
Absence of overthrown by unconstitutional or violent indicators (Kaufmann,
Violence means, including domestic violence and Kraay, and Mastruzzi)
terrorism.
Lobbying The EBRD-World Bank Business WB Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Environment and
Survey (BEEPS) compiles the experiences Enterprise Performance
of approximately 20,000 firms in twenty-six Survey (BEEPS)
transition countries plus Turkey in three
rounds: 1999, 2002 and 2005. The survey
examines the quality of the business
environment as determined by a wide
range of interactions between firms and the
state.
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Political Party
Financing
The Global Integrity Report is a tool for
understanding governance and anti-
corruption mechanisms at the national level
written by local researchers and journalists.
Each country assessment contained in the
Global Integrity Report comprises two core
elements: a qualitative Reporter's
Notebook and a quantitative Integrity
Indicators scorecard, the data from which
is aggregated and used to generate the
cross-country Global Integrity Index. An
Integrity Indicators scorecard assesses the
existence, effectiveness, and citizen access
to key governance and anti-corruption
mechanisms through more than 300
actionable indicators. It examines issues
such as transparency of the public
procurement process, media freedom, asset
disclosure requirements, and conflicts of
interest regulations.
V. CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA:
LOOKING AT THE DATA
To assess the impact of corruption and economic freedom on economic
growth in oil and gas-rich Latin American countries, we broaden the sam-
ple of countries beyond those in the Latin American region by including
groups of oil-rich and oil and gas-dependent countries in different per
capita income brackets and with different measured levels of corruption
and economic freedom. We examined the GDP per capita of these coun-
tries and assessed their broader economic development performance by
looking at their political progress and their social achievements. We also
combine corruption indices and separate them by typology of corruption
in order to investigate the particular facets of corruption that pose the
greatest impediment to economic growth. Our analysis identifies a link
between corruption and sustainable economic growth (an inverse positive
relationship). The electoral system component was found to have a U-
shaped relationship with the measures of economic performance and
human development.
VI. OIL AND GAS DEPENDENCY
"To classify the dependence of countries on oil and gas, we use two
measures: (1) the share of oil and gas exports in total exports and (2)
government revenues from oil and gas as percentage of total government
revenues.
'79
Based on their oil and gas dependency we have identified the following
countries: OPEC countries (Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Kuwait,
Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Venezuela and Iraq), Argen-
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tina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Russia, Mexico, Norway, Azerbaijan, and
Kazakhstan. 80 The oil, refined products, and gas exports of the Latin
American countries, except for Venezuela, comprise about 20-40 percent
of their total exports and their governments receive around 30-40 percent
of their revenues from oil and gas sales.8 1 In addition, we use the World
Bank country income classification to distinguish between the lower-mid-
dle, upper-middle, and high-income countries. In Table 1, we list the
countries with oil and gas dependency which are determined by the ex-
ports of oil and gas as a percentage of total exports and by the revenues
from oil and gas as a percentage of total government revenues.8 2 If we
look at the Latin American countries over time, we observe a great varia-
tion in oil dependency. Mexico seems to be the only country where the
oil dependency is falling over time due to an increase in exports of mer-
chandise other than oil and gas.8 3
TABLE 4: OIL DEPENDENCY
Oil And Gas Revenue as a
Oil And Gas Exports as a Percentage Of Total Government



















80. Iraq was not included in the study due to lack of reliable data. We added Brazil
due to the largest oil discoveries in recent years. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., BIRA-
ZIL, http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/brazil/brazil.pdf (last visited May 5,
2014).
81. See infra Table 1.
82. Id.
83. See infra Figure 1.





IR Iran 86.13 67.71
Nigeria 96.56 76.19
*Average during 1997-2000
Source: Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, International
Monetary Fund (2008); AGUSTIN CARSTENS, Tim UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, ME7XICO IN
A GLOBALIZED Wo.LI) (2007) available at http://research.chicagobooth.edu/igm/events/
speaker-series/docs/mexicoinaglobalizedworld.pdf; Ehtisham Ahmad & Eric Mottu, Oil
Revenue Assignments: Country Experiences and Issues (Int'l Monetary Fund Working
Paper No. 02/203, 2002), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wpO2
203.pdf; International Trade Centre, Trade Competitiveness Map, http://legacy.intracen
.org/applil/fradeCom/TPTPCl.aspx?RP=008&YR=2010 (last visited May 5, 2014);
World Development Indicators 2009, THE WORLD BANK (2009).
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VII. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL PROGRESS,
AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE IN PETROLEUM
DEPENDENT ECONOMIES
Among the upper- and lower-middle income countries, Argentina,
Venezuela, Mexico, Libya and Brazil demonstrate the highest real GDP
per capita.84 Of these nations, only Mexico and Brazil seem to follow a
relatively steady growth pattern while the growth of the other economies,
for the most part, closely tracked changes in oil prices.
84. For the GDP per capita between 1960-2007 of petroleum dependent countries in
the upper- and lower-middle income bracket (listed in Table 1), see infra Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2: GDP PER CAPITA, CONSTANT US$ 2000, 1960-2007
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To further investigate the link between economic freedom, corruption
and economic growth, we examine the relationship between the measure
of economic growth using GDP based on purchasing power parity (ppp)
per capita and nine indices measuring different dimensions of economic
development, political progress, and social performance. These indices
include the Index of Economic Freedom, Human Development Index,
Business Environment Score, Failed State Index, Corruption Perception
Index, Global Integrity Index, Governance Indicators, Polity Index and
Corruption as perceived by foreign investors. As mentioned before, we
use the World Bank classification to distinguish between the high-income,
upper-middle-, and lower-middle countries.
The figures below show that, on average, higher income oil exporters
tend to do better on all the indicators related to their economic/business,
Constant $ 2000
10000
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political, institutional environment. However, there are some exceptions
to this general observation.
The Index of Economic Freedom assesses ten specific freedoms rang-
ing from property rights, government size, trade and monetary freedom
to entrepreneurship. Figure 3 shows the relationship between GDP per
capita (expressed in terms of ppp unless noted otherwise) and the Index
of Economic Freedom. It would appear that among the lower-income
countries Ecuador tends to do better and is closer in performance to the
upper-middle income countries such as Brazil and Algeria. Libya, on the
other hand, falls far behind its counterparts in the upper-middle income
countries. Venezuela seems to perform on par with Russia in terms of
economic freedom and is far behind other Latin American countries such
as Argentina and Mexico.
FIGURE 3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA AND
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Source: WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVEI OPMENT INDICATORS, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
(2009).
Note: GDP per capita is expressed in ppp8 5
A = high income, B = upper-middle income, and C = lower-middle income countries 8 6
Y refers to GDP per capita ppp and X refers to the Index of Economic Freedom
* = indicates a statistical significance at 0.01 level, ** = indicates a statistical significance at
0.05 level
The Human Development Index (HDI), which is a combination of edu-
cation, life expectancy and income indices, is typically used to measure a
country's overall economic development, political progress, and social de-
velopment. Azerbaijan, Ecuador, and Iran seem to have better overall
human development as opposed to their counterparts in the same lower-
85. GDP is expressed in PPP unless otherwise noted in all charts and figures.
86. Area A countries are high income, Area B countries are upper-middle income,
and Area C countries are lower-middle income countries. This holds the same for
all charts.
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income group. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and Algeria are lagging
behind their counterparts in their respective groups. Figure 4 shows the
relationship between GDP per capita and the Human Development
Index.
FIGURE 4: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA AND
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The overall Business Environment Score is used to quantify the attrac-
tiveness of the business environment with indicators varying from the po-
litical environment, the macroeconomic environment, market
opportunities, policy towards free enterprise and competition, policy to-
wards foreign investment, including ease of starting a business, foreign
trade and exchange controls, taxes, financing, the labor market and infra-
structure. The analysis shows that Brazil and Mexico have better busi-
ness environments, while Algeria is scoring poor in comparison to the
other countries in the upper-middle income group. In terms of its busi-
ness environment Ecuador is leading in the lower-middle income group,
it is comparable to the upper-middle income countries such as Kazakh-
stan and Venezuela. Figure 5 displays the relationship between GDP per
capita and the Business Environment Score.
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FIGURE 5: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA
AND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SCORE
GDP per capita,
1996-2007
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Source: WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENI INDICATORS, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE
UNIT (2009).
Note: Y refers to GDP per capita ppp and X refers to the Business Environment Score
* = indicates a statistical significance at 0.01 level
The Failed State Index comprises of twelve indicators covering a wide
range of elements of failed state: inability to collect taxes, extensive cor-
ruption, criminal behavior, inequality, discrimination, severe demo-
graphic pressures, brain drain and environmental decay. Figure 6 shows
the relationship between GDP per capita and the Failed State Index. The
analysis shows that Saudi Arabia is an outlier among high-income coun-
tries due to the growing population of young people that need jobs, low
tax base, group grievance, uneven development, security issues, factional-
ized elites, legitimacy of the state (lack of representation since political
parties only exist on the local level), and arbitrary application of the Rule
of Law. Although Argentina and Ecuador seem to do relatively well
when compared to other countries in their respective income categories,
both countries still suffer from numerous problems. For example, Argen-
tina faces "[large income inequality], poverty, extensive deforestation,
human rights abuses by police and corrupt relations between governors
and judicial system in the provinces."' 87 High incidence of "migration [of
skilled workers], lack of political leadership [in the form of constant
change of constitutions, among other things], drug-trafficking network
within the country" prevail in Ecuador. 88 Venezuela in the same way as
Russia and Kazakhstan, is falling behind the upper-middle income coun-
tries due to "existing [income inequality among the population, massive
and endemic] corruption in [the judicial system or profiteering by ruling
elites], legitimacy of the state, [lack of political opposition], high media
scrutiny, [human rights violations], and [fragmentation of the ruling]
87. THE FUND FOR PEACE, COUNTRY PROFILE: ARGENTINA (2009).
88. THE FUND FOR PEACE, COUNTRY PROFILE: ECUADOR (2009).
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elites. '89 Colombia, with its "ongoing insurgencies heavily financed by an
illegal drug trade and [significant violations of] human rights, [limited ac-
cess to education, and high] poverty" leans towards the lower-middle in-
come group of countries.90
FIGURE 6: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA
AND FAILED STATE INDEX
GDP per capita,
1996-2007
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0 Brazil Eualf' * . Nigbt'a
0 20 40.................--------a 100 120
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Source: WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, FUND FOR PEACE.
Note: Y refers to GDP per capita ppp and X refers to the Failed State Index
* = indicates a statistical significance at 0.01 level, *** = indicates a statistical significance
at 0.10 level
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures the overall level of
corruption and not the expected outcome. It is a mix of third-party
surveys to sample public perceptions of corruption through a variety of
questions, ranging from "Do you trust the government?" to "Is corrup-
tion a big problem in your country?" In the upper-middle income group,
Mexico, Colombia and Brazil have a relatively low level of corruption as
opposed to Argentina and Libya. Venezuela is lagging behind, along with
Russia and Kazakhstan, due to considerable "illegal flight of capital, cor-
rupt practices, 9 1 risk of expropriation, 92 extensive bribes extorted to facil-
itate services, secure procurement contracts, and clear customs. '93 Figure
7 illustrates the relationship between GDP per capita and the Corruption
Perception Index.
89. THE FUND FOR PEACE, COUNTRY PROFLE: VENEZUELA (2009).
90. THE FUND FOR PEACE, COUNTRY PIROMLE: COLOMBIA (2009).
91. See generally Raymond W. Baker, The Biggest Loophole in the Free-Market Sys-
tem, 22 WASH. Q., Autumn 1999, at 27.
92. See generally Francisco Monaldi, Sunk-Costs, Institutions, and Commitment: For-
eign Investment in the Venezuelan Oil Industry (Dec. 2001), available at http:H
www.stanford.edu/class/polisci3l3/papers/MonaldiFeb04.pdf.
93. See generally TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON THE TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL CORRUIrlON BAROMETER 2007 (Dec. 6, 2007), available
at http:/larchive.transparency.org/policy-researchlsurveys-indicesgcb2007 (last
visited Mar. 19, 2014).
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FIGURE 7: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA AND
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The Global Integrity Index annually evaluates the existence and citizen
access to national-level anti-corruption mechanisms. The Index does not
measure corruption; instead, it examines the spread of corruption and
investigates the mechanisms to combat it-government accountability,
regulation, the rule of law, transparency, and citizen oversight. The Index
is comprised of 15,000 peer-reviewed questions. Figure 8 displays the re-
lationship between GDP per capita and the Global Integrity Index. Ec-
uador and Kazakhstan score higher when compared to their respective
counterparts, while Algeria is a laggard due to its recent civil war trou-
bles.94 While plagued by corruption in the form of politicized appoint-
ments and an ineffective public procurement process, Ecuador, unlike
other countries in its respective group, still enjoys a media that acts as an
"effective watchdog. '95
94. THE GI.OBAL INTEGRITY REPORT, ALGERIA, Corruption Timeline (2007).
95. THE GLOBAL INTEGRITY REPORT, ECUADOR, Country Assessment (2008).
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FIGURE 8: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA
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*** = indicates a statistical significance at 0.10 level
The World Bank Governance Indicators include six dimensions: Voice
and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terror-
ism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and
Control of Corruption. These governance indicators are measured in
units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5; higher values correspond to better
governance outcomes. These indicators reflect the quality of governance
as seen by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respon-
dents, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, and international organizations.
Figure 9 shows the relationship between GDP per capita and Govern-
ance. In terms of overall governance, Saudi Arabia is again an outlier
among all high income oil and gas-rich countries. Argentina, Mexico and
Brazil tend to score relatively well compared to other countries in the
upper-middle income group. Venezuela is among the countries that had a
significant decline on this indicator due to significant media restrictions,
political instability, poor law enforcement, and a poor judicial system.
Respondents in Venezuela, Argentina, and Ecuador have a low confi-
dence in the ability of their governments to formulate sound policies and
promote private businesses. On the other hand, Colombia and Algeria
managed to increase their government efficiency over this period of time.
Yet, Ecuador seems to have higher government accountability compared
to the lower-middle income group, and Algeria is scoring low in compari-
son with its counterparts. There is also a big gap within the high-income
countries group with nations ranging from Saudi Arabia in a lower tier to
Norway and Canada in an upper income tier.
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FIGURE 9: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROWTH IN GDP PER CAPITA
AND GOVERNANCE
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* = indicates a statistical significance at 0.01 level
The regression results for growth in GDP per capita versus indicators,
such as Index of Economic Freedom, Human Development Index, Busi-
ness Environment Score, Failed State Index, Corruption Perception In-
dex, Global Integrity Index, Governance, did not seem to be statistically
significant. The correlation between GDP per capita and growth in GDP
per capita and two indicators of Polity Index and Corruption (PRS
Group) were not statistically significant either.
To summarize, we find countries such as Argentina, Azerbaijan, Ecua-
dor, Iran, and Mexico to have relatively high level of human develop-
ment, in terms of health, education and income. Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, and Ecuador possess an environment that is conducive to bus-
iness and tends to have lower levels of both corruption and problems with
government accountability as opposed to Russia, Venezuela, Kazakhstan,
and Algeria. While the more democratic Ecuador rates high for its in-
come, level of human development, business environment, governance
and accountability, and a "relatively free media," 96 it is still among the
group of failed states such as Russia and Algeria. This is largely due to "a
high "migration [of skilled workers], lack of political leadership [in the
form of constant change of constitutions], and a drug-trafficking network
within the country."'97 One of the most successful among these Latin
American countries is Mexico with a high literacy rate similar to that of
Russia, and a significant increase in merchandise exports other than pe-
troleum. However Mexico still struggles with "law enforcement [chal-
lenges], corruption in [its] police forces, human rights [violations] and [a
weak] judiciary branch to fight organized crime." 98 Another leading
96. Id.
97. Tin, FUND FOR PEACE, COUNTRY Ptoi-iiu: ECUADOR, supra note 88.
98. Tin, FUND FOR PEACE, COUNTRY PROFILE: Mixico (2009).
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country, Brazil, enjoys a "thriving business environment, [and a good]
system of free public university [education]." 99 Yet, it also has "unequal
income distribution, poverty, poor access to public services, and human
rights abuses. Argentina, which is far from being called a "failed state,"
still faces "[large income inequality], poverty, extensive deforestation,
human right abuses by police and corrupt relations between governors
and the judicial system in the provinces."'100 Venezuela, perceived as the
most corrupt in the Latin America, falls behind its counterparts in the
upper-middle income group due to "existing [income inequality among
population, massive and endemic] corruption in [the judicial system or
profiteering by ruling elites], legitimacy of the state, [lack of political op-
position], high media scrutiny (that is, the media is highly scrutinized and
harassed), [human rights violations], and [fragmentation of ruling]
elites."10 1 Colombia, with its "ongoing insurgencies heavily financed by
an illegal drug trade and [significant violations of] human rights, [limited
access to education, and high] poverty"'1 2 is close to the lower-middle
income group of countries. We can conclude that with all the challenges
they face, Mexico, Brazil and Ecuador are still at the forefront of the oil
and gas dependent countries of the Latin America.
VIII. MEASURING CORRUPTION
In this section, we look at the factors that are generally seen as strongly
associated with corruption: level of political and civil liberties, govern-
ance, and qualities of democratic or autocratic authorities in governing
institutions. Some major studies (Mauro, 1997) on corruption have
tended to use corruption indices to statistically explain growth through
the composition of government expenditure and investment ratios, while
others (Svensson, 2005) found human capital, openness to trade, freedom
of press, and regulation of entry start-ups to be important elements of not
only defining but measuring the degree or level of corruption. Given the
recent advances in efforts to quantify corruption through indexing and
ranking, we investigated corruption indices developed by various well-
established research institutions and multilateral agencies. We further
subdivided these indices based on their methodologies and typologies: (i)
ranking-based, (ii) survey-based, and (iii) special projects indexes. Table
3 shows some of the major indices that attempt to measure corruption.
Due to the lack of consistent data, we are forced to utilize only a portion
of available methodologies. Our sample period is from 1996 to 2007 and
our assumption is that a wide variety of economic conditions can be cap-
tured during this particular twelve-year timeframe.
99. THE FUND FOR PEACE, COUNTRY PROFILE: BRAZIL (2009).
100. THE FUND FOR PEACE, COUNTRY PROFILE: ARGENTINA, supra note 87.
101. THE FUND FOR PEACE, COUNTRY PROFILE: VENEZUELA, supra note 89.
102. THE FUND FOR PEACE, COUNTRY PROFILE: COLOMBIA, supra note 90.
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TABLE 5: VARIOUS METHODOLOGIES FOR MEASURING CORRUPTION
RANKING-BASED INSTITUTION
International Country Risk Guide Political Risk Services, Inc.
Financial Ethics Index (FEI) Business Environment Risk Intelligence
(BERI)
Public Integrity Index Global Integrity
SURVEY-BASED
Corruption Perception Index Transparency International
Global Corruption Barometer Transparency International
Bribe Payers Index Transparency International
The Worldwide Governance Indicators World Bank
(WGI) project
Business Environment and Enterprise EBRD, World Bank
Performance Survey (BEEPS)
Anti-corruption Assessment Index World Bank
(ACAI)
Business International IMF, Economist Intelligence Unit
Freedom Freedom House
Electoral Democracies Freedom House
Failed State Index Fund CAST
Open Budget Open Budget Initiative
Polity index Center for Intern. Dev. and Conflict,
University of Maryland
Opacity Index PricewaterhouseCoopers/MIT Sloan
SPECIFIC PROJECTS
Revenue Transparency Project Transparency International
Public Accountability Project World Bank
Publish What You Pay Open Society Institute
A. VARIABLES AND MEASURES
1. Corruption Measurements
To derive our independent variable of corruption we used the well-
established Political Risk Services, Inc.'s (PRS) International Country
Risk Guide-an annual index which is commonly used in the litera-
ture. 10 3 This particular index measures the degree of corruption as per-
ceived by foreign investors. The value of this variable ranged from 0 to 6,
with 0 indicating a high level of corruption and 6 representing a low level.
According to the PRS, this variable is a measure of corruption within the
political system that is a threat to foreign investment by distorting the
economic and financial environment, reducing the efficiency of govern-
ment and business by enabling people to assume positions of power
103. See, e.g., Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic
Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1251, 1266 (1997).
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through patronage rather than ability, and introducing inherent instability
into the political process.
Another variable we use is Freedom in the World from the Freedom
House, which is a combination of political rights and civil liberties as
measured by the World from Freedom House. "F," "PF," and "NF," re-
spectively, stand for "Free," "Partly Free," and "Not Free." We have as-
signed the following values to the countries: "free" countries-3, "partially
free" countries-2, and "not free" countries-i, so that 3 signifies a higher
level of country's freedom. Dummy variables are used for electoral de-
mocracies from the Freedom House index (Yes=1 indicates that a country
was considered to be an electoral democracy for the year; No=O indicates
that a country was not).
We also utilize the World Bank Governance Indicators, which include
six dimensions such as: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and
Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory
Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These governance in-
dicators are measured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5; higher val-
ues correspond to better governance outcomes. These indicators reflect
the quality of governance as seen by a large number of enterprise, citizen
and expert survey respondents, as reported by a number of survey insti-
tutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international
organizations.
We used the Polity Index because its approach is unique in that it ex-
amines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in
governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms
of governance. The "Polity Score" captures a regime's authority spec-
trum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10
(consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted to re-
gime categories: we recommend a three-part categorization of "autocra-
cies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5 and the three special values: -66, -
77, and -88), and "democracies" (+6 to +10).10 4
2. Economic Performance Indicators
To investigate the impact of corruption on economic development, we
use the following economic performance indicators to measuring various
aspects of development i.e. standard of living: GDP per capita growth
(annual percentage), GDP per capita, PPP (current international $),
HDI, and the Index of Economic Freedom.
The data on GDP per capita, PPP and annual growth rate of GDP per
capita were obtained from the World Bank World Development Indica-
104. The Polity scheme consists of six component measures that record key qualities of
executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competi-
tion. It also records changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing author-
ity. The Polity data include information only on the institutions of the central
government and on political groups acting, or reacting, within the scope of that
authority. It does not include consideration of groups and territories that are ac-
tively removed from that authority (i.e., separatists or "fragments").
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tors. The Index of Economic Freedom obtained from the Heritage Foun-
dation assesses ten specific freedoms ranging from property rights to
entrepreneurship. We use it as a measure of potential output. The
Human Development Index (HDI) is a combination of education, life
expectancy, and income indices is used to measure country' development;
however, we believe that it deficient in the arena of human rights.
3. Control Variables
To control for oil dependency, we utilize the variable that we used in
the first part of our paper-the share of oil and gas exports in total ex-
ports. The data are taken from the International Monetary Fund, the
International Trade Center Trade Competitiveness Map, and World Bank
Development Indicators.
IX. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
In trying to measure corruption and its impact on economic develop-
ment we use the following econometric methodology. We use a dynamic
panel with data averaged over three-year periods from 1996-2007. Our
primary hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Other things being equal, high corruption is associated
with low levels of economic development in oil- and gas-rich countries.
As to be expected, corruption indicators seem to be highly correlated
with each other. On the one hand, that shows consistency of given indica-
tors, but on the other hand, we introduce the issue of multi-collinearity
into the estimation. In order to reduce the subjectivity of the individual
indices, as well as deal with the multi-collinearity, we have used the Prin-
cipal Components Analysis to best capture opinions of the observers who
constructed the corruption indices. It allows for constructing the stan-
dardized uncorrelated variables with mean 0 and variance 1.
To analyze the Latin American region in detail, we have formed a sec-
ond hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Other things being equal, high corruption is associated
with low levels of economic development in Latin American oil- and gas-
rich countries.
X. RESULTS
Tables 6 and 7 provide the descriptive statistics and the most and least
corrupt countries, respectively. Not surprisingly, Colombia and Vene-
zuela demonstrate a lack of political stability. Interestingly, Ecuador,
which is perceived to be the least corrupt by its foreign investors among
these countries, still faces a significant decline in government effective-
ness. 105 As mentioned before, Venezuela, with its socialist policies, is
105. See supra Table 5.
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seen to perform the worst in terms of regulatory quality, or the percep-
tions of the ability of the government to formulate sound policies to pro-
mote private sector development. Also, the country faces a low
confidence in the quality of property rights, the police and the courts, as
well as a lack of mechanisms to control corruption.
Interestingly, other Latin American countries such as Brazil, Mexico,
and Argentina, unlike the Persian Gulf countries, seem to have demo-
cratic authorities in place. The extent to which the citizens of these three
countries can participate in the election process and express their free-
dom of speech is close to that of Canada and Norway. Mexico is also
among the top five performing countries in terms of regulatory quality, or
the ability of government to promote private businesses, which is not sur-
prising given its proximity to the United States.
On the other hand, small and politically stable states of the Persian
Gulf, such as the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar demonstrate high levels of
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption.
TABLE 6: SUMMARY STATISTICS, 1996-2007, 3-YEAR PERIODS, N=80
Standard Minimum Maximum
Mean deviation value value
Growth rate of GDP per 4.54 -3.89 27.36
capita
GDP per capita, PPP 15,901 15,976 1,221 72,239
HDI 0.77 0.12 0.45 0.97
Index of Economic 56.21 11.78 23.96 77.06
Freedom
PRS's Corruption 2.57 1.12 1.00 6.00
Freedom in the World 1.77 0.77 1.00 3.00
Electoral Democracy 0.45 0.49 0.00 1.00
Polity Index 0.64 7.18 -10.00 10.00
WB Voice -0.46 0.88 -1.91 1.58
WB Political Stability -0.39 0.96 -2.30 1.43
WB Government -0.14 0.89 -1.33 2.14
Effectiveness
WB Regulatory Quality -0.24 0.87 -2.14 1.58
WB Rule of Law -0.27 0.96 -1.62 2.00
WB Control of -0.18 0.99 -1.54 2.23
Corruption
Oil Dependency 62.34 32.58 1.00 99.55
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As to be expected, corruption coefficients are highly correlated with
each other (Table 9). We decided to carry the Principal Component Anal-
ysis (provided in Table 10) to group the corruption variables in similar
groups. We dropped the Voice/Accountability from the WB Governance
Indicators because it had high loads on more than one component; hence,
it was not considered as a pure measure of any one construct.
Table 8 shows the variability in the set of individual indices explained
by each principal component, as well as the correlation of the first two
components with each of the individual indices. In each case, the first
two principal components explain close to 90 percent of the variability
among the individual indices and have high positive correlations with
each of them. Thus, we only use the first two principal components in our
regression analysis. Using the factor loading of 0.40 or greater as a cut-
ting threshold, we find Freedom, Electoral Democracies and Polity index
to load on the first component, which we subsequently labeled "electoral
system component." Six items: Corruption, Political Stability, Govern-
ment Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of
Corruption, loaded on the second component, which was labeled "busi-
ness/legal system component."
TABLE 10: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS
Factor 1 - Factor 2 -
Variation Correlations Business/ Electoral
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Table 11 provides the results of the dynamic panel regression, which
incorporates the Principal Component Analysis results. We find the cor-
ruption indices that belong to the so-called "business/legal system" to be
statistically significant. This component deals with corruption "as per-
ceived by foreign investors,"10 6 a diverse range of households and firms,
as well as thousands of experts from NGOs, public sector agencies and
private sector. 107 It captures the extent, to which public power is exer-
cised for private gain, and to which agents abide by the rules of society; it
also evaluates the quality of public services, property rights, the ability of
the government to formulate sound policies to promote private sector,
the likelihood of crime and violence and the likelihood that the govern-
ment may be overthrown by violent means. 10 8 We believe that they can
also be used to make predictions about a country's economic, as well as
human development, performance. The greater values of this component
are associated with the lower levels of corruption as determined above.
These finding support our first hypothesis that high corruption is associ-
ated with low levels of economic development in oil- and gas- rich coun-
tries. However, it only holds for such characteristics of corruption such as
those combined under Factor 1 (Business/Legal System): investment cli-
mate, political stability, quality of regulatory framework, and measures to
control corruption.
When we start looking at corruption from the perspective of "electoral
system," we find a quadratic non-linear relationship between the corrup-
tion indices associated with this component and the measures of eco-
nomic performance. 10 9  Both types of countries, autocratic and
democratic, seem to enjoy relatively high human and economic develop-
ment. The relationship between them has a U-shaped form.
106. INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GuiDE MI-THIoo)otOGY, Ttru PRS GROUP; Zohal
Hessami, On the Link Between Gov't Ideology & Corruption in the Public Sector
(June 15, 2011), available at http://extranet.isnie.org/uploadslisnie201l/hessami.pdf
(unpublished paper for 2011 ISNIE Meeting at Stanford University).
107. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII:
Aggregate & Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2008 4 (The World Bank Dev.
Research Grp., Working Paper No. 4978, June 2009).
108. Id. at 5-6.
109. See, e.g., supra Figure 10.
CORRUPTION, CONSTITUTIONS, & CRUDE
FIGURE 10: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDP PER CAPITA
AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM
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These analyses identify a paradox in the linkage between corruption
and sustainable economic growth in oil- and gas-based dependent coun-
tries. It turns out that corruption has a differential impact on countries'
economic performance and human development; the nature of relation-
ship changes depending on which dimension of corruption we are
investigating.
When combining different dimensions of corruption, we find the coun-
tries under consideration fall into four quartiles. °10 In the first quartile
we see the least corrupt and most democratic oil- and gas-rich countries
of Norway and Canada. The Persian Gulf countries, with the exception
of Iran, fall into the second quartile. The Latin American countries in the
fourth quartile can be characterized as free or partially free democracies
with regularly held elections and civil rights, allowing citizens to express
their political views. The greater the political rights and civil liberties of
citizens are, the greater should be the proclivity of the government offi-
cials to be elected. The more democratic the authorities that govern insti-
tutions are, the better the country's economic and human development
should be. Yet, the Latin American countries are still relatively more
corrupt in terms of government efficiency, law enforcement, and promo-
tion of private business than the Persian Gulf countries. Also, given the
fact that all the Latin American countries are in more or less the same
phase of having electoral democracies, it is interesting to see that their
GDP per capita level is still relatively low when compared to countries of
approximately same level in quartile I.
110. See supra Figure 11.
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FIGURE 11: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUSINESS/LEGAL, ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS, AND GDP PER CAPITA
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Note: Size of bubbles equals GDP per capita. We use a panel data, 1996-2007.
Source: INTIRNATIONAL TRADE CENTER, TRA1)E MAP-TRADE COMPFTIIVENESS MAP
(2010); WORiD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2009) (authors' calculations).
FIGURE 12: HDI PERFORMANCE
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Note: a panel data, 1996-2007.
Source: UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGAMME, NATIONAL AND RiGIONAL HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORTS (2009).
Given such a difference in GDP per capita for the level of their electo-
ral system and the levels of corruption in business/legal system between
Venezuela and, for example, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, it is surpris-
ing to find that there is not much variability in the levels of human devel-
opment across the Latin American region. When we further investigate
which countries in this region have a more corrupt business and legal
CORRUPTION, CONSTITUTIONS, & CRUDE
environment, we see an inverse relationship between how corrupt gov-
ernments are and how dependent the governments of these countries are
on oil and gas. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, which are relatively less
dependent on oil and gas exports, tend to have lower levels of corruption
as perceived by foreign investors, NGOs, and many other experts, as op-
posed to Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia.
FIGURE 13: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUSINESS/LEGAL, ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS, AND OIL DEPENDENCY
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Note: Size of bubbles equals Oil Dependency (Oil and gas exports as % of total exports).
We use a panel data, 1996-2007.
Source: INTERNATIONAL TRADE CI-NThR, TRADE MAP-TRADE COMP'IrTIV1ENrSS MAP
(2010) (authors' calculations).
While in the above analysis we try to define the factors that are respon-
sible for successful economic performance of oil-and gas-rich countries, it
should be noted that this type of analysis has significant limitation. The
lack of consistent and reliable data continues to plague this type of re-
search even though recently a wide variety of corruption indicators have
been developed. Also, the statistical information submitted by the gov-
ernments of some countries is incomplete and varies in quality. Most cer-
tainly we face the causality issue when conducting this type of research.
Many studies claim corruption evolves (or devolves) in response to
changes in the economic development of a country. Poor governments
are not capable of sustaining a high wage for public officials, and it is well
documented in the literature that low civil services wages (below private
markets wages) breeds corruption.111 On the other hand, rapid moderni-
111. Jie Bai, Seema Jayachandran, Samuel P. Huntington, Does Econonomic Growth
Reduce Corruption? Theory & Evidence from Vietnam (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 19483, Sept. 2013); Caroline Van Rijckeghem & Bea-
trice Weder, Corruption & the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil
Service Cause Corruption? 1-2 (Int'l Monetary Fund, WP/97/73, June 1997).
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zation in the country may cause higher corruption.112 It is, however,
equally important to recognize that corrupt institutions may, in fact, de-
termine the economic development and success of country.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
In the first part of this study we found that even though there is high
corruption, several countries still exhibited good economic performance.
This is true, for example, in Libya and Kazakhstan. Furthermore, it is
interesting to note that when the World Bank Governance indicators are
used, several small oil- and gas-rich Persian Gulf countries (Qatar, Ku-
wait, and the UAE) show that they are relatively less corrupt on all the
indicators (except voice, and accountability) ranging from rule of law,
control of corruption, and political stability. In Latin America, all coun-
tries, except Venezuela, offer an environment conducive to business as
opposed to other countries in this upper middle income category, such as
Russia and Algeria, which were found to have environments hampering
the growth of private businesses. This suggests, for example, a differen-
tial effect of corruption on the business as opposed to the political
environment.
Next, in investigating the political environment, we found that the
"electoral system" component-which combines such variables as a pres-
ence of electoral democracy, state of the country (free/not free), and
whether the country is an autocracy or a democracy-has a U-shaped
relationship with countries' economic performance and human develop-
ment. This suggests that countries at both ends of the spectrum ranging
from autocratic to democratic regimes may still enjoy relatively similar
levels of human and economic development.
The laws guarding against corruption related to the exploitation of nat-
ural resources are simply not respected or enforced. The "business/legal
system" component, which tries to capture corruption as perceived by a
large number of stakeholders, including foreign investors, NGOs, and
public service, indeed plays a significant role in the context of corruption
and economic growth (an inverse positive relationship). The link be-
tween business/legal framework and economic growth manifested a posi-
tive correlation between economic and human development and the
"business/legal system" component.
There is a huge disparity among the Latin American countries in terms
of business and legal environment. Countries that are rated as more cor-
rupt demonstrate a larger export dependency on the sales of oil and gas.
Interestingly, all the Latin American countries attain approximately the
same level of human development and civil liberties. This suggests that
corruption in the business and legal environment may significantly hinder
the businesses in countries that are heavily dependent on oil and gas ex-
ports. Having an electoral democracy seems to have no significant effect,
112. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 32 (1968).
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as all the Latin American countries enjoy relatively similar levels of
human development. It is possible that countries heavily dependent on
oil and gas such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia can afford to sub-
sidize the social programs for their citizens.
The timeframe of our analysis is too short to fully gauge the effect of
corruption on sustainable economic growth. With corruption, the time
horizon should be measured in decades, rather than in years. In the long
run, countries that have higher freedom tend to have higher non-oil GDP
growth. No highly corrupt country with low freedom can gain a growth
advantage over a country that has had two decades or more of low cor-
ruption and high freedom.
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